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Abstract
Recent announcements by large asset management firms have indicated an increased
emphasis on sustainability within the investment mainstream. This article argues
that shareholders have a central role in driving the transition to a green economy
and it explores the key reasons why their impact on listed enterprises is crucial. It
is concluded that in order to support this development from a policy perspective,
information standards must be adopted to promote transparency for the right audience.
Furthermore, policy makers should direct measures towards passive investments as
well. Ultimately, well-coordinated, environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
investments can be leveraged as a central tool to mitigate the effects of climate change.
With his CEO letter in early 2020, Larry Fink,
CEO and Chairman of BlackRock, has captured
the investment world’s attention. Emphasising
the financial risk of climate change, he announced
that the world’s largest fund manager will focus
on a more sustainable portfolio and an increased
transparency in the investment process [1]. In
doing so, BlackRock seemingly shows a strong
commitment to putting sustainability at the core
of its operations. Clearly, the announced strat-
egy alone will not disrupt the entrepreneurial
environment on a larger scale. In fact, due to
their predominantly passive portfolio structure,
a potential divestment would directly affect less
than 0.01 per cent of BlackRock’s total assets [2].
Nevertheless, the letter raises hopes that both in-
vestors and asset managers will follow their lead
in establishing an environmentally responsible
mindset at the heart of the financial sector.
The case for a
shareholder-driven transition
to a green economy
Despite the urgency to act upon the threat of
climate change, the results of existing approaches
to the overwhelming challenge have been incre-
mental, at most. There are two key reasons for
that inertia. Firstly, markets have consistently
failed to put a price tag on environmental ex-
ternalities of economic behaviour. As a result,
growth has been fuelled by the overprovision of
greenhouse gas-emitting and polluting products
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at prices below their actual social cost [3]. It is
the risk of this unsustainable system that, accord-
ing to Fink [1], ‘markets have not reflected’. The
second reason lies in the short-term orientation of
both the economic and the political environment:
corporate decision makers are still incentivised
to quickly meet shareholders’ expectations and
politicians are under pressure to achieve results
before the next election occurs. In this myopic
system, considerations of sustainability, which
require a larger time horizon, have been upstaged
or neglected completely.
With large asset management corporations like
BlackRock, a new group of players has entered the
stage. They could finally bring powerful levers to
the table and enable the change that policy mak-
ers have aspired to for years. As a result, Fink’s
letter might mark a crucial turning point in the
young history of human answers to the climate
crisis: it paves the way for a shareholder-driven
transition to a green economy.
Environmental activists have often referred to the
financial sector as a main contributor to climate
change [2]. Therefore, the idea of relying on them
to shape the green transition might sound ironic.
Indeed, the financial sector has not been designed
to promote sustainability and many corporate
leaders still share the impression that investors see
environmental goals as compromises to their re-
turns [4, 5]. However, the idea to harness finance
for good is by no means new. Building on Rudolf
Steiner’s vision to create non-conventional finan-
cial institutions for an anthroposophical cause,
the first social banks were founded in Europe in
the mid-seventies and a decade later the concept
of socially responsible investing picked up momen-
tum in the US and Japan as well [4]. Furthermore,
organisations across the world have promoted
the opportunities of green finance. Among oth-
ers, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) [6] published a roadmap on sustainable
financial systems, the OECD [7] informed on in-
vestment channels to enable institutional invest-
ments in green energy, and the UK Government
recently released its pioneering strategy on green
finance [8]. Although these ideas had a positive
impact, they were, as Jones [4] points out, ‘not
yet transformational’.
The power of the investment
mainstream
This time, the situation has a different momen-
tum. Previous forms of shareholder activism re-
lied on alternative investments by progressive
individuals [4]. Over the years, however, sustain-
able investment assets have risen globally as illus-
trated in Figure 1. Today, environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) issues seem to have be-
come assimilated by the investment mainstream
[5]. Moreover, instead of policy proposals and
regulation pushing for sustainable investments,
it seems to be the shareholders’ intrinsic moti-
vation to proactively advocate a green financial
sector. As a result, they might become the motor
of a green transition. There are three reasons to
support this view.
Firstly, demand for ESG investment products
is rapidly increasing. As investors start to care
about the impact of their money, asset managers
are encouraged to design more sustainable portfo-
lios in the first place [5]. In particular, the willing-
ness of major institutional investors to stand in
for ESG values has put pressure on the financial
sector and plays a role in Fink’s ongoing advocacy
of sustainable investment. A few months before
his announcement, the Government Pension In-
vestment Fund of Japan – one of the world’s
largest pension funds – had shifted a consider-
able share of their assets away from BlackRock
to emphasise their ESG-based mission [2]. As
millennial investors have shown to be even more
concerned about having a positive impact, this
development is expected to continue further [12].
Secondly, shareholder activism has become more
fashionable and since investors’ intentions have
started to align across industries, it might be
more influential than ever [5]. Studies imply that
its impact on the environmental and social be-
haviour of listed firms is effective. Neubaum and
Zahra [13] found evidence that activism by long-
term institutional owners has a positive effect
on corporate social performance. Building on
previous ideas of stakeholder salience, they ar-
gue that large owners exert power by ‘monitoring
and [. . . ] challenging executives’, and that cor-
porate decisions regarding sustainability would
therefore be aligned with the shareholders’ pref-
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Figure 1: Sustainable investment assets by region in trillion US-$ (Data: [9–11].)
erences (pp. 112-114) [13]. By this mechanism,
investors can exert influence on firms to provide
more environmentally conscious products and ser-
vices. This view is supported by findings showing
an improved governance on green innovation in
predominantly institutionally-owned firms when
external shocks such as changes in the regulatory
environment occur [14].
Thirdly, a high concentration in the investment
market accelerates the green transition even fur-
ther. There are two aspects to this argument. On
the one hand, as Eccles and Klimenko [5] point
out, the top ten asset managers hold more than
a third of the global externally managed assets.
As there is no way for them to hedge against
climate change, they are forced to think more
long-term and mitigate effects on the global econ-
omy. On the other hand, a few major investors
can coordinate better to design their portfolio in
a more sustainable way. Such a harmonisation
of long-term interests tends to affect corporate
social performance of firms positively [13]. Tak-
ing into account that concentrated ownership has
been found to be beneficial for innovation in gen-
eral [15], leveraging these effects will be crucial
to drive the green transition at the required pace.
Policy implications
With these opportunities in mind, the question
remains as to how the regulatory environment
should be designed for the financial sector to fa-
cilitate the rise of the green economy. Here, trans-
parency by both shareholders and stock compa-
nies has been identified as a key factor [16]. From
the early days of responsible investing, informa-
tion provision has been a constant and relevant
pattern in its development [4]. Once implemented,
a transparent financial system does not only en-
able efficient monitoring, but also fosters collab-
oration between investors, for example through
project exchange networks as suggested by the
OECD [7]. Therefore, initiatives like the Task
Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
should be endorsed across the world, as done by
the UK Government in 2017 [8].
However, information is purposeless to investors
as long as it is primarily released for non-financial
stakeholders like NGOs [5]. Current ESG assess-
ments are predominantly qualitative and come in
a variety of forms. In order to make investments
comparable, the message needs to be conveyed
in a language that financial decision makers are
able to comprehend quickly and intuitively [17].
Thus, environmental and social impact ought to
be measured in a way that is comparable to other
metrics of business analysis [17]. To tackle this
problem, joint standards need to be developed
and put into use. They can build on existing
approaches like the ESG metrics advocated by
leading scholars in the U.S. [18], or the work of
the European Union, which recently agreed on a
taxonomy for sustainable investments [19].
Whichever measures will be taken, they must
cover the vast portion of passive investments as
well. Therefore, indexing companies have to be
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taken into consideration by the regulator as they
are the ones who automatically choose assets for
mainstream managers [20]. If these entities have
to live up to transparent ESG standards as well,
there is hope that a competition for sustainable
passive portfolios will arise. As a result, they are
encouraged to adjust their algorithms towards
more sustainable assets.
Conclusions
To conclude, although announcements alone are
not going to have any transformative effect, they
promote the shareholder-driven transition to a
green economy. If investors and asset man-
agers can leverage the learnings from almost five
decades of non-mainstream sustainable investing,
they have the potential to induce a major shift
in corporate decision-making. The main factors
in their future impact are a growing demand for
ESG products, the power of shareholder activism,
as well as a highly concentrated investment mar-
ket. Policymakers should embed this momentum
in an environment of transparency and common
standards. In that, there is hope to induce far-
reaching changes across industries and to have
found an effective tool to strive for climate change
mitigation.
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